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Two years after the delivery of the report on The Measurement of Economic 
Performances and Social Progress (Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi), this paper provides some 
further reflections on the subject. Since 2008, when the work of the Commission began, 
the world has experienced several dramatic events  which all call into question our 
measurement systems and the policies which were grounded on them: the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008, the grave events in Japan, the Sovereign debt crisis, and the 
revolutions in the Arabic world. In particular, the Japanese earthquake and its aftermath 
underlines three central shortcomings of our metrics: the measurement of the 
“economic product”, the measurement of well being, and the measurement of 
sustainability.  
For economists, these concerns are especially important, because we often rely on 
statistical (econometric analyses) to make inferences about what are good policies.   
Those inferences are only as reliable as the metrics  that they are based on. Our 
statistical systems should tell us whether or not what we are doing is sustainable, 
economically, environmentally, politically, or socially and whether proposed policies 
will in fact enhance well-being .  There would be little sense in pursuing policies aimed 
at increasing some widely used metric like GDP  ifsuch policies  lead to a decrease in 
well being.   
                                                 
* Paper presented at the 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, Beijing 4-8 
July 2011.   3
There is a compelling case for constructing better metrics.  The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi 
report highlighted the deficiencies in existing metrics, outlined an agenda for 
improvements, and discussed key areas on which further research is needed.  Since the 
publication of the report, not only have these ideas come to be widely accepted, but 
there has been some progress in implementing the agenda. 
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There is not a single year where our measurement systems are not called into question, 
and as a consequence it will take more time than we would like to understand what is 
going on in the world economy.  
The “financial” crisis revealed that we (and especially the United States) were not 
doing as well as we thought we were when looking at the available metrics.   That is, 
we realized that economic growth was not sustainable, and the output measures had 
been exaggerated by bubble prices in real estate and by fictional profits in the financial 
sector.  The fact that in some countries (such as the US) GDP has returned to pre-crisis 
level does not capture, in anyway, the diminution in the sense of well-being.  With 
almost one out of six Americans who would like a full time job--and other facing high 
anxiety at the risks they face of the loss of a home or a job--and cutbacks threatened in 
the basic public expenditures programs, the loss in well-being is enormous. The 
situation in Spain is even worst, with an unemployment rate higher than 20% on 
average and almost one out of two young Spanish unemployed!  
 
The events in Japan can be seen as a metaphor of our measurement problems. Some 
suggest that while in the short run, GDP may go down, in the long run it will rise as a 
result of the reconstruction efforts.  The nuclear disaster has increased anxieties--and 
may well have significant health effects on large numbers of the population.  Again, the 
expenditures required to respond may raise GDP, perhaps enough to get Japan out of its 
long standing economic malaise.  But no one would claim that Japan is better off as a 
result.  It would require a huge increase in GDP to compensate for the destruction of 
capital, of all kinds of assets, that the event has caused, and to offset the increased 
anxieties that so many in the country face today. And we are not good – our metrics are 
not adapted – at measuring the value of the lost assets. And even if it were, the 
arithmetic of compensation will not tell us much about the way the well being of 
Japanese people has evolved. The mechanical nature of our economic models will tell 
us nothing about the immaterial consequences of the irreversible losses of the people. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, we now realized that our measurements before the crisis 
were also not accurate.  GDP may have been higher because of the greater efficiency 
(cost savings) as a result of the reliance on nuclear (as opposed to say renewable) 
energy.  The placement of the spent nuclear material in a way that exposed the entire 
country to risks that are now so evident too may have contributed to a seeming higher 
GDP then.  But just as accounting frameworks before the financial crisis mispriced risk,   5
so too in Japan.  The Japanese case is thus a metaphor because it underlines the three 
shortcomings of our metrics: the measurement of the “economic product”, the 
measurement of well being, and the measurement of sustainability. 
 
  Another universal fact well documented is the intra-country increase in inequality 
which has characterized at least the past quarter of century. Looking at the growth of 
GDP or at that of Net income, would tell us nothing about this fact, and would certainly 
give us a wrong impression about the evolution of societal well being. A striking fact is 
that in OECD countries the increase of income of 80% of the population has been lower 
than the rate of growth of the overall economy (which is, obvious, an average) and the 
more so the lower is the decile considered.   If we seek numbers that assess the impact 
of economic growth on society as a whole, surely we want to know what is happening 
to most citizens.  GDP tells us nothing about that.   
 
Another example is provided by the revolution in the Arabic world, especially in 
Tunisia which opened the process. Some economists (see for example Barro
1) think that 
political freedom is a luxury good which leads to a lower rate of growth, because of the 
quest for redistribution to which it leads. Setting aside whether such claims rest either 
on sound theoretical or empirical foundations (at least in the case of Tunisia, the lack of 
democracy contributed to corruption, which had an enervating effect on growth), here 
too the concept used is misleading. GDP is not a measure of well being.  Even if it 
could be shown in regressing growth of GDP on some indices of political freedom that 
limiting political freedom leads to increases GDP – and quite apart from the fragility of 
such empirical exercises – the conclusion that countries would be well-advised to 
postpone democratization until they can afford this luxury makes no sense. It may well 
be that well being increases more from an increase in political freedom than from an 
increase in  GDP, especially given the way GDP is measured. In debating about the 
effect of political freedom on the evolution of GDP, we are missing an essential point: 
the risk taken by the people to fight for freedom is a testimony that it is a fundamental 
component of well-being.  
 
                                                 
1 Robert Barro: “Determinants of Economic Growth: a Cross-Country empirical Study”, NBER Working 
Paper n°5698, August 1996.   6
These are just some examples of how our present statistical system, both flaws in the 
available metrics and the absence of alternatives, may implicitly lead to erroneous 
policy conclusions. 
 
All of this is important because what we measure affects what we do.  Reducing well-
being to increase whatever imperfect measure of material wealth gives rise to totally 
flawed policies.  
 
I. Metrics and policies 
 
For economists, these concerns are especially important, because we often rely on 
statistical (econometric analyses) to make inferences about what are good policies.   
Those inferences are only reliable as the data that they are based on.  Some studies 
suggested that financial market or capital market liberalization contributed to higher 
economic growth.   It is now clear that such studies' conclusions were flawed because 
(i) GDP numbers in the growth spurts were exaggerated by the bubbles that are often 
associated with such liberalizations;  (ii) unless an adequate time horizon is taken, the 
losses that follow the crashes will not be taken into account—and these losses may 
more than offset the short term gains arising from the bubbles to which liberalization 
often gives rise; (iii) the distributive consequences of those policies are not taken into 
account--so that even if GDP goes up, it may be the case that most citizens are worse 
off; and (iv) the costs to well-being—from, for example, the insecurity that follows 
volatility that typically accompanies such liberalization measures--are not taken into 
account.  More generally, the empirical studies conducted to demonstrate the beneficial 
effect of financial market liberalization on growth and employment, are vulnerable to 
the same kind of limitations. There is thus a hiatus between some of the usual policy 
recommendations and the weaknesses of the evidence to support them.  
 
To take another example, there has been a wealth of econometric studies aimed at 
showing how certain labour market institutions and the adverse effects they have on the 
flexibility of the labour market affect unemployment and growth. These studies of the 
impacts of the particular institutions under study on unemployment are, at best, able to 
explain effects that are of second order of importance. Two studies based on a sample   7
of 19 OECD countries independently conducted on the subject
2  reached the same 




Putting aside for the moment an evaluation of the contention that more flexible labor 
markets do increase GDP (reducing the cumulative disparity between actual and 




Many of the advocates of unfettered markets—who see any intervention, whether 
through say public policy or private institutions, as welfare decreasing—ignore the 
extensive and well-documented “market failures,” which are especially widespread in 
labor and capital markets.  Some institutions have been created to make up for failures 
in insurance markets and training.  If our metrics do not capture the benefits of the 
greater security that unemployment insurance provides, the reform that is needed is not 
the abolition of unemployment insurance, but of the flawed metrics.   Some of these 
institutions can be thought of as reflecting a social contract that arises from a 
democratic process. There are winners and losers to any structural reform, so such 
reform is unlikely to lead to a Pareto-improving outcome, or even one supported by a 
majority of the electorate. But, and even more importantly, the move towards a greater 
flexibility of the labor market could affect negatively at least two of the main objective 
determinants of well-being: the quality of jobs (the quest for a decent job) and 
economic security.
5  In short, out of very weak evidence drawn from ill measured 
                                                 
2 See Jean Paul Fitoussi and Olivier Passet,:  « Réduction du chômage: les réussites en Europe », Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique, n°23, La Documentation Française, 2000 ;  and Richard Freeman :Single peaked 
vs diversified capitalism : the relation between economic institutions and outcomes », NBER Working 
Paper, n° 7556,2000. 
3 That conclusion is at odds with the common wisdom according to which the diversity of institutional 
structures plays a determinant role in explaining both unemployment and growth.  Institutions do 
matter—the Scandinavian experience shows that active labor market policies and the corresponding 
institutions may enable labor markets to function better, at least in periods in which there is not a large 
deficiency in aggregate demand.  Our discussion here focuses on those institutions that allegedly lead to 
less flexible labor markets.     
4 In particular, research growing out of the Fisher-Greenwald-Stiglitz debt-deflation literature shows that 
with imperfectly indexed contracts, greater wage and price flexibility may be associated with deeper 
downturns and slower recoveries.  Indeed, in a cross section study of volatility, wage and price rigidities 
were far less important than financial market factors.  See Easterly et al.(2001a, 2001b, 2003).  Weaker 
job security will reduce workers’ willingness to invest in firm-specific capital, and thus can undermine 
growth and productive efficiency.   
5 Security is, of course, an important aspect of what is viewed as a good job.  Here again, there are 
grounds for ???   8
phenomena, we could draw policy recommendations whose implementations may 
reduce the well being of the people.  
 
Of special concern are the econometric inferences about good policies we draw from 
cross country regressions. Whether we like it or not, international comparisons of levels 
and more importantly of rates of growth play a very important role in the design of 
policy. To some, cross country regression provide us greater confidence in making 
these comparisons, by isolating the effects of certain factors that are thought to help 
explain differences in performance across countries. 
 
Many of the critiques of this methodology are well known.  For instance, usually this 
type of exercise proceeds by constraining coefficients to take the same value across 
countries as if it were a single model (both economic and social) that is able to explain 
economic and welfare outcomes all over the world quite independently of the specific 
choices and institutional arrangements made by different countries. If the equation fits 
for one group of countries but not for another the panel estimation may yield significant 
results due only to the inclusion of the first group. The implications are obvious:  it 
would be wrong to extend the inferences to a country that belongs to the second group.   
 
Our concern here with cross country regressions is about another caveat. Comparisons 
are only meaningful if the procedures and definitions used to compute the accounts are 
comparable and if there are not in-built biases in the construction of the data series 
themselves. Yet there are still “large differences in the ways National Accounts 
calculations are carried out even among European countries, let alone between Europe 
and the U.S
6”. This may have far-reaching consequences. It makes no sense, for 
instance, to structural reforms intended to import the “best practice” of the country 
performing the best in terms of growth rate, if the growth rates of the two countries 
differ mainly because of differences in the ways National Accounts are computed 
 
Another example, reflective of a failing in GDP measurement that has long been 
recognized, arises in analyses of the effect of the size of government on growth.   
Because output in the public sector is typically measured by its inputs, there is an 
                                                 
6 Joachen Hartwig (2005): “On Misusing National Account Data for Governance Purposes », Working 
paper 05-101, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH, Zurich.   9
implicit assumption of no productivity growth, when in fact in some cases (where 
detailed studies have been conducted, or on the basis of casual empiricism) we know 
there is rapid productivity growth.  Inevitably, such assumptions bias cross-country 
regressions, to suggest that a larger public sector is associated with smaller rates of 
productivity growth.  The result is not a deep empirical insight; it is simply a statistical 
artefact of measurement.  Consider, for instance, what might happen if one were to 
privatize America's social security (the public old age pension system.)  We know that 
transactions costs for that system are an order of magnitude lower than for private 
annuity programs.  It is extraordinary efficient, and surveys have shown that it is also 
very "customer responsive."  Privatization would result in higher profits for America's 
financial services industry and lower benefits for American's retirees.  The higher 
profits would likely be reflected in an increase in GDP.  But the well being of 
Americans would be decreased, and the gains of the financial industry would be at the 
expense of the average retirees.  Well-being, appropriately defined, would go down.  
But it is easy to see how in the mindless cross-country regressions that have become the 
fashion, one might conclude that such a privatization would be good for "growth." And 
more importantly, even if it were – and it is not – should we conclude that democracies 
all over the world should choose a small state (and become impotent)?   
 
II. Use and Misuse of the Concept of sustainability 
 
We can do better.  The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress identified a number of reforms.
7  Some would lead to a better GDP 
metric--so that even if GDP is not a measure of well-being, it is a better measure of 
whatever it is that it is attempting to measure. In effect, the purposes of our statistical 
systems are multiple, and a metric that is adapted to one purpose may be ill suited to 
another. Sometimes confusion is engendered when a measure adapted to one purpose is 
used to highlight another. For example, GDP is neither a measure of income nor a 
measure of well-being. What we want to measure is the key question.  We may want to 
measure, for instance, the levels of market activity—one of the original objectives of 
national income measurement.  
 
                                                 
7Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean Paul Fitoussi: Mis-measuring our lives, Why GDP does not 
add up, The New Press 2010    10
But increasingly, there is a demand to go beyond measures of market activity to 
measures of well-being. And even before the crisis, there were worries about 
sustainability—and that our metrics did not tell us anything about whether what we 
were doing was sustainable.   
 
That is why some would encourage more focus on other metrics.   Looking at the (real) 
income of the median individual would give us a better picture of what is happening to 
the typical individual in society that GDP per capita. Before the crisis, many thought 
that the U.S. had been performing well.  But if they had looked at median income, they 
would have seen that incomes were stagnating or declining--and such measures did not 
even account for the greater insecurity as a result of reduced health insurance coverage 
or weaker retirement protection as a result of the shift from defined benefit programs to 
defined contribution programs.  Growth at the expense of the sustainability of owns life?  
 
We care about the future—that the living standards that we enjoy today should be 
enjoyed by future generations.  Our statistical systems should tell us whether or not 
what we are doing is sustainable, economically, environmentally, politically, or socially.  
There is reason to believe that, at least in certain dimensions, what we are doing is not 
sustainable, but current statistics do not reflect this—just as they gave little indication 
of the unsustainability of the U.S. economic growth in the years preceding the crisis.  
 
It is important for any society to form an assessment, no matter how imperfect, about 
whether its current consumption or well-being is sustainable, and whether this is 
coming at the expense of future generations. We can ascertain whether a society’s 
wealth is increasing or decreasing (per capita). If (appropriately measured) it is 
increasing, then presumably society can do in the future whatever it did today, i.e. it can 
sustain its per-capita income. But we need a comprehensive measure of wealth, and we 
need to be sure that the valuations are correct. A comprehensive measure obviously 
includes measures of physical capital, human capital and natural capital (including the 
environment). Changes in capital include those arising from investment in plant and 
equipment, education, the depletion of natural resources, depreciation of physical 
capital, and environmental degradation.  
   11
Because we know that prices do not adequately reflect the true social costs of carbon 
emissions and the risks that a major change in carbon prices would impose on all asset 
prices, we felt reluctant to use, or at least rely on, market prices to assess environmental 
sustainability, suggesting instead the concurrent usage of physical metrics.   
 
One of the problems encountered in the aftermath of the financial crisis is the misuse of 
the concept of sustainability. The lack of an indicator of sustainability may lead us to an 
unsustainable path, but a partial measure may lead us to wrong policies which would 
eventually jeopardize the sustainability of an economy. A case in point is Europe. 
Sharing a common currency in a global crisis, Euro Zone countries are currently 
looking for sustainability indicators in order to assess the financial sustainability – by 
which they mean essentially the sustainability of the public debt – of each member 
country: they are trying to define sustainability objectives, implement economic 
policies that are “sustainability friendly” and spread information to financial markets in 
order to reduce pressure on public and private sectors borrowing. The problem is that 
European countries are focussing on a very partial view of sustainability, namely the 
sustainability of public debt, which lead them to impose on peripheral countries 
austerity programmes, i.e. procyclical policies, which would likely result in a much 
lower rate of growth and may eventually lead to financial unsustainability both in the 
public and the private sector.  Whatever measure we devise, we have to recognize that 
it will be grounded on our present imperfect knowledge of the future.   
 
Inevitably, metrics are partially grounded in models:  many of the metrics upon which 
focus are not ends in themselves, but are viewed as intermediate variables of interest 
because they provide insight into things we really care about.  But the relationship 
between these intermediate variables and the things we really care about are often 
uncertain, and depend on the model.  But there is a great deal of uncertainty about the 
right model.  For instance, prior to the crisis, many believed that all a country needed to 
do to maintain high and stable growth was to maintain low and stable inflation.  In the 
aftermath of the crisis, there is broad consensus that low and stable inflation was 
certainly not sufficient for economic stability. Those policy conclusions were 
themselves predicated on wrong models.  And those wrong models encouraged 
economists to focus on a single variable, inflation, as an indicator of the country's   12
future prospects.  We now know that there should have been more focus on indicators 
of financial stability. 
 
Similarly, those who argue a second metric of focus should be debt/GDP, and that debt 
GDP ratios above a given level (say 80%) are not sustainable are basing this conclusion 
on models.   Given the present level of wealth (both public and private), even higher 
levels of debt might be sustainable, if there is rapid enough technological progress. 
Greece is not bankrupt, but threatened to be so. Financial markets judgment is a 
(possibly) educated guess about what will be the future, but can’t be more than that, 
given their fantasy in the valuation of asset prices. Keeping that in mind, it may not be a 
terribly good idea to force the Government of Greece to privatize public assets to 
reduce its public debt.  A fire sale would actually worsen the government's balance 
sheet.  It will also lead to a dismantling of the public sector which will limit the scope 
for future intervention and through this limitation may impede policies geared at 
sustainability.  
 
III. Assessing Well Being 
 
The members of our Commission felt strongly that GDP did not provide a good 
measure of well-being, even contemporaneously—setting aside the question of whether 
current standards of living were sustainable.  We urged the construction of broader 
measures of well-being that would take some account of some of the most important 
factors that affect well-being that were not yet included in GDP metrics, like 
connectedness. 
 
In our report, and in the discussion surrounding its presentation, we highlighted though 
another of the debate over measurement:  While a focus on false measures might distort 
policy, a dialogue around what we, as a society, care about, and whether these concerns 
are adequately reflected in our statistics, could contribute not only  to an enhanced 
understanding of the limitations of these standard statistical measures, but to the 
formulation of better policies, more reflective of the concerns and values of citizens.    
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We believe that that in fact has been the case. In many countries, notably in France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK steps have been taken to implement some of the 
recommendations of our report. But the most comprehensive exercise undertaken has 
been the study of OECD released in May 2011, « the OECD Better Life Initiative ». It 
shows the will of the Organization to dialogue with the civil society by allowing each 
Citizen to build his own aggregate index of the quality of life. 11 indicators have been 
selected by the OECD for the 34 countries of OECD and some emerging countries, 
according to the domains identified in our report. People are asked to compute their 
own index by selecting the weight of each determinant of well being through an 
internet interactive tool called « Your Better Life Index». 
 
Most of the determinants considered but one are objective (Health, Employment, 
Education, Housing conditions etc.), but one pertains to the subjective category, namely 
life satisfaction. It is obtained through surveys. The subjective determinants of well 
being are obviously important. In effect, a long philosophical tradition views 
individuals as the best judges of their own conditions. But they are subject to a kind of 
“time inconsistency” problem, as they may evaluate their circumstance (or even a 
particular event) in a different way at different periods of time. Some persons may 
answer at the very moment they are raising their children that this activity is painful, 
while when asked 20 years latter they may remember of this period as the most 
satisfactory of their life.  
 
How to interpret and use these different results in developing well-being metrics is a 
subject on which there is on-going research.
8  We are hopeful that not only will this 
research lead to better metrics, but active engagement with civil society will result in 
policies that are directed at the improvement of societal well-being—reflected not in 
some flawed measure of GDP, but of the newly constructed measures.   
Surely, in the present circumstances, most of our countries need more growth; But 
growth of what? The usual answer is the growth of GDP but a better answer should be 
the growth of well being, that is of what really matters for citizens. The shift from the 
former to the latter objective requires most probably an enrichment of the instruments 
                                                 
8  For two earlier surveys, see ,  Sunstein, C.R., Kahneman, D., Schkade, D., & Ritov, I. (2002). 
Predictably incoherent judgments.Stanford Law Review, 54 , 1153-1215. 2002 and Kahneman, D., & 
Krueger, A.B. (2006). Developments in the measurement of subjective well-being. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 20 , 3-24. 2006.     14
of public policies and a much more selective approach to policies aimed at increasing 
GDP: it will serve no purpose if this aim is achieved   at the expense of well being.  
 
IV. Well Being and the Business Cycle 
 
This broader and redefined perspective on measurement is relevant not only for 
assessing the long term progress of society, but also for understanding cyclical 
fluctuations, such as the one that much of the world is now experiencing. (Ironically, it 
was precisely to understand cyclical fluctuations that the narrower GDP measure was 
originally developed.)  Earlier we noted that before the crisis, GDP was exaggerated.  
But one can argue that in the crisis, the loss in well-being may also be underestimated.  
The Commission’s initial report emphasized the importance of employment itself. One 
point where various subjective measures of people’s well-being agree is that 
unemployment has a very adverse effect on people’s quality of life. People who 
become unemployed report lower life-evaluations, even after controlling for their lower 
income. The adverse effects persist over time. The unemployed also report higher 
prevalence of various negative affects (sadness, stress and pain) and lower levels of 
positive ones (joy). One may also suspect that the adverse effects of unemployment are 
felt even by those who are not themselves unemployed, especially in societies where 
there is high unemployment. These subjective measures suggest that the costs of 
unemployment exceed the income-loss suffered by those who lose their jobs, reflecting 
the existence of non-pecuniary effects among the unemployed, and of fears and 
anxieties generated by unemployment in the rest of society.  
  In the US, some seven million families have already lost their home.  Both are 
contributing to increased levels of anxiety, even among those still with jobs and homes.  
There are identifiable effects of home ownership on individuals’ sense of and 
participation in community and investments in local schools--and possibly therefore in 
the future well-being of their children.  There is evidence too of adverse health effects.
9 
  
All of this suggests that economic fluctuations may have strong asymmetric effects on 
well being – something we should already intuitively have known.  Moreover, some of 
the consequences (e.g. on health and education) may be irreversible.  However, the 
                                                 
9 See Janet Currie and Erdal Tekin Health Consequences of the Foreclosure Crisis,” April 2011.   15
prevalent use of GDP as the intermediate indicator results in our not taking explicitly 
account of these adverse effects, not only on the current level of well-being, but also on 
the “stock” of human capital. The economics of the business cycles should be rethought 
in light of the probable discrepancies between the fluctuation of output and that of well 
being. It may well be that it would better for governments to devise policies aimed 
more at minimizing the rate of unemployment and its variation over the business cycle 
rather than policies aimed at maximizing output growth (as measured by GDP). Some 
of the instruments for implementing these two strategies may be the same – 
employment concerns are central to overall macroeconomic strategy – but surely the 
first strategy needs specific, supplementary ones, to smooth the evolution of 
unemployment. Risks too may be very asymmetric:  an extended period of high 
unemployment may have far higher long term consequences than those that might arise 
from a slightly overheated economy.   Moreover, in light of the preceding arguments 
such a strategy will surely enhance well being even if there were some adverse effects 
on growth, as measured by GDP.
10  The design of good policies can’t be grounded on 
the artificial separation between social policies and macroeconomic ones: if the well 
being of the people is the ultimate end, employment, labor market analysis and income 
distribution must be central components of the macroeconomic analysis supporting 
stabilization policies.  
 
V. Beyond GDP: The Experience of Bhutan 
 
We should note one further example--Bhutan--whose quest for better metrics began 
long before the work of our Commission.  Some forty years ago, the King at the time 
enunciated that the country's goal was not to maximize GDP but GNH, gross national 
happiness.  Rather than turning to an Economic Development and Planning Agency for 
formulating development strategies, the country established a Gross National 
Happiness Commission.  It was more than a matter of words.  Questions were raised 
that typically do not get raised in a single-minded focus to increase GDP:  (a)  What is 
the impact on the environment (typically not priced correctly within GDP.  Forest cover 
was increased, even if cutting down forests might have, in the short run, increased 
                                                 
10  We should emphasize, however, that there are some reasons to believe that a greater focus on 
employment security might also enhance not just current well-being, but even growth, e.g. by facilitating 
greater investments in human capital and a greater willingness to undertake risk.   16
GDP).  (b)  What is the impact on "social capital" (social cohesion)?  This is something 
that is virtually never priced into GDP.  Trust in government can allow better 
compliance with environmental regulations (without which restrictions on cutting down 
forests would be very hard to enforce) or more responsiveness to government efforts to 
improve education and health of children--actions which almost surely will improve 
GDP in the future, but the benefits of which will not show up in today's GDP.   
 
Out of this has grown a more holistic approach to development, which sees 
development as a transformation of society, receiving the benefits of modernization (e.g. 
greater literacy, more political participation, better health) while retaining traditional 
values and a national sense of identity.  Development is seen as more than just the 
accumulation of more factors of production or an increase in static efficiency.  New 
questions are asked, and out of these, new approaches are taken:  What is the impact on 
entrepreneurial and societal learning?  Opening up construction bids for a new school to 
all contractors, foreign or domestic, might lead to lower short run costs--a seeming 
better economic performance today--but the encouragement of local builders using 
local materials and techniques and designs that accord to local preferences and which 
might have relevance for other  construction activities might have much greater long 
term growth benefits.    
 
Bhutan is consciously involved in a process of societal transformation, and so, for that 
country, it was imperative that they think deeply about the directions in which their 
society was being transformed.  But all of our societies are changing, evolving, if ever 
so slowly, in a far more evolutionary way.  If well designed, our metrics can give us 
indicators of where we are, and over time, can provide a picture of where we are going.  
They can give us information that can allow us assess whether we are achieving our 
objectives—and, even if we are succeeding in the metrics that we set as our objectives, 
are there other less toward consequences that we need to address.   
 
Our assessment of current metrics has left us convinced that, too often, they have led 
countries to set off in the wrong direction, or at least to adopt policies of ambiguous 
benefits.  Our quest for better metrics has convinced us that there are today available 
metrics that could provide better guidance.  And our research has shown that there is   17
considerable scope for the improvement in these metrics and the development of new 
metrics that will provide corresponding more closely to societal objectives.   
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